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Lab-in-the-ﬁeld experimentAlthough farmers in developing countries are generally thought to be risk averse, little is known about the actual
form of their risk preferences. In this paper, we use a relatively large lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment to explore risk
preferences related to sweet potato production among a sample of farmers in northern Mozambique. A unique
feature of this experiment is that it includes a large subsample of husband and wife pairs. After exploring corre-
lations between husband and wife preferences, we explicitly test whether preferences follow the constant rela-
tive risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, and whether farmers follow expected utility theory or rank dependent
utility theory in generating their preferences. We reject the null hypothesis that farmers' preferences follow the
CRRAutility function, in favor of themoreﬂexible power risk aversion preferences. Ifwemake the common CRRA
assumption in our sample, we poorly predict risk preferences among those who are less risk averse.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Although it is generally assumed that farmers in rural areas of devel-
oping countries are risk averse, little is known about the actual form of
their risk preferences. When economists attempt to measure risk pref-
erences, they typically assume that risk preferences follow the constant
relative risk assumption (CRRA) utility function (see Cardenas and
Carpenter (2008), Delavande et al. (2011) or Hurley (2010) for recent
reviews of the literature). However, the consequences of simplymaking
this assumption without testing it are unclear. Few studies actually test
risk preferences in the ﬁeld without making the CRRA assumption. An
important exception is Holt and Laury (2002)who consider amoreﬂex-
ible parameterization of the utility function, although they do so in a
laboratory experiment setting.
Furthermore, it is likely that risk preferences among farmers in
developing countries are important constraints that keep farmers
from reaching their productive potential. Smallholders in developing
countries face risk at several points in the production process. Dercon
and Christiaensen (2011) explicitly show that Ethiopian farmers are
constrained in technology adoption by risk. Furthermore, Boucher
et al. (2008) argue theoretically that a class of farmers is risk-rationed
in Peru; that is, due to risk, some farmerswill not try to access the formal
credit market, even if it would raise their productivity and incometh Vargas Hill, J.V. Meenakshi,
contributions that have greatly
011 CSAE Conference at Oxford
alifornia.
. This is an open access article underlevels. Overcoming such barriers to risk, then, could help farmers in de-
veloping countries improve their livelihoods along several dimensions.
Understanding the heterogeneity of risk preferences and the impli-
cations of making speciﬁc assumptions about the form of risk prefer-
ences may have consequences as programs are designed to help
farmers in developing countries overcome several different potential
sources of risk. Several impact evaluations have recently been conduct-
ed on pilot projects related to weather insurance, with mixed success.
Cole et al. (2013) test the importance of the insurance contract price
on take up in India by randomizing price offers, and ﬁnd that average
take up in participating villages is around 25%, though almost no one
takes up insurance in neighboring villages that did not receive a visit
from insurance agents. Hill and Robles (2011) ﬁnd similar take up
(27%) in a pilot project in southern Ethiopia that offered small amounts
of insurance, rather than attempting to insure the farmer's entire pro-
duction. Additional information about the type and distribution of risk
preferences among farmers might be important in informing the design
of weather insurance contracts, to improve take up.
In this paper, we use experimental data collected in rural
Mozambique to elicit risk preferences of farmers participating in an ag-
ricultural program that promoted orange ﬂeshed sweet potatoes
(OFSP). The experiment to elicit risk preferences was framed around
the adoption of sweet potato varieties and consisted of presenting a
menu of ordered lottery choices over hypothetical gains to the farmers.
The data were collected in the ﬁnal survey of a randomized evaluation
designed to evaluate an intervention that provided farmers with OFSP
vines, information about how to grow OFSP, and the relative nutritional
beneﬁts of consuming orange rather than white sweet potatoes, partic-
ularly for women of child bearing age and children under ﬁve years old.
One unique aspect of the experiment is that it was conducted separatelythe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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was therefore conducted with 682 farmers from a total of 439 house-
holds. Within households in which both head and spousewere present,
we examine the correlation between the husband's and the wife's
preferences.
We use the data to consider and test several models of risk prefer-
ences against one another.We initially compare two contendingmodels
of choice under uncertainty, Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Rank
Dependent Utility (RDU). Quiggin (1982, 1993) have proposed a Rank
Dependent Utility (RDU) framework that can be considered a generali-
zation of EUT. Under RDU, subjective probabilities are not constrained to
be equal to objective probabilities, as in EUT. Instead, agents are allowed
to make their choices under uncertainty according to a nonlinear prob-
ability weighting function.1 We then consider a general class of value
functions that explicitly allows for variation in relative risk aversion,
relaxing the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) that
is often made in the literature.
Our primary contribution to the literature is thatwe use data collect-
ed in a lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment to nest different potential models of
risk preferences, and thenwe develop and test thesemodels against one
another. We are also able to examine risk preferences among the head
and the spouse, and to consider whether they predict one another's
risk preferences within this hypothetical context. We further construct
a model that allows for heterogeneity in the theoretical basis for risk
preferences; namely, EUT or RDU. Our experiment is related to the lab
experiment conducted by Andersen et al. (2010), who conduct a lab
experiment among 150 subjects and elicit both risk preferences and
subjective probabilities, using real payoffs. In general, our ﬁnding is rel-
atively consistent with both Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Andersen et al. (2010); we ﬁnd that the RDU dominates EUT, and we
generally reject the hypothesis of CRRA, regardless of the formof prefer-
ences. We then show the magnitude of errors that take place if one as-
sumes CRRA preferences. We ﬁnd that farmers who are less risk averse
are more susceptible to mischaracterization under the CRRA assump-
tion than more risk averse farmers, based on the results of our model.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the risk premium implied by RDU is substan-
tially higher than that of EUT, suggesting that one explanation for low
take ups of rainfall insurance in developing countriesmay be amischar-
acterization of risk preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next sectionwill discuss the liter-
ature on the measurement of risk preferences, both in the laboratory
and in ﬁeld experiments. The third section describes the setting in
which the data collection and ﬁeld experiment took place, as well as
more details about both. The fourth section presents and discusses the
results, and the ﬁnal section concludes.2. Measuring risk preferences in developing countries
A large body of literature characterizes risk preferences among resi-
dents of developing countries. In most cases, the EUT is used as a con-
ceptual framework to frame risk preferences, although more recently
some authors have also considered alternative utility frameworks for
choice under uncertainty (Harrison et al., 2010; Liu, 2013; Tanaka
et al., 2010). Previous work on characterizing risk preferences has
been based either on the use of experimental lotteries or on the analysis
of production decisions collected from household survey data. We will
focus on the ﬁrst line of work since this paper also uses experimental
lottery data from the ﬁeld. Here, we only summarize papers that are di-
rectly relevant to our analysis.21 RDU is related to prospect theory (PT)which further postulates that agents value risky
lotteries differently in the gain and loss domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Since the
experiment presented in this paper only takes place in the gain domain,we cannot empir-
ically test EUT or RDU versus PT.
2 See Hurley (2010) for a recent and more exhaustive review.Binswanger (1980, 1981) are among the ﬁrst studies to provide for-
mal tests of risk aversion among farmers in a developing country. The
papers describe both hypothetical and real payoff lotteries to Indian
farmers in which the outcome probabilities were ﬁxed, but the payoffs
of the lotteries varied. These studies found that most Indian farmers in
the study were risk averse, and that the degree of risk aversion in-
creased with the monetary payoff of the lotteries. Overall, these results
suggested that farmers' choiceswere consistentwith increasing relative
risk aversion (IRRA) and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Using similar procedures, Miyata (2003) and Wik et al. (2004)
studied Indonesian and Zambian villagers, respectively. Conﬁrming
Binswanger (1980, 1981)'s ﬁndings, they also found that farmers'
preferences are characterized by extreme to moderate degrees of risk
aversion, by DARA, and by non-increasing or decreasing relative risk
aversion.
Mosley and Verschoor (2005) studied three different countries
(Ethiopia, India and Uganda), and combined choices over lottery pairs
with hypothetical certainty equivalent questions. Similar to Binswanger
(1980, 1981), they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between risk aversion
and respondent characteristics such as age, gender, literacy, income or
wealth. Responses obtained from the hypothetical certainty equivalent
questions, however, do correlate signiﬁcantly with the data collected
through real payoff lottery choices. In contrast with the results found by
other authors, Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) used a data set collected in
northern Ethiopia, and found that risk aversion is signiﬁcantly correlated
with respondent characteristics such as household composition, income
and wealth.
Hill (2009) relied on stated preferences and beliefs to identify the ef-
fect of risk aversion on production decisions for a sample of Ugandan
coffee growers. Using both nonparametric and regression analysis, she
ﬁnds that higher risk aversion translates into a lower allocation of
labor towards a risky perennial crop such as coffee. This effect dissipates
among wealthier farmers. This result underscores the importance of
understanding risk preferences for measuring speciﬁc farmer level
outcomes.
More recently, Liu (2013), Tanaka et al. (2010), and Harrison et al.
(2010) depart from the previously citedwork to consider an alternative
utility framework to EUT, in the form of Prospect Theory (PT) or RDU
models. These studies also contrast with previous work in the way lot-
tery choices are elicited. Instead of ﬁxing the outcome probabilities
and varying the lottery stakes, as proposed by Binswanger (1980),
they follow Holt and Laury (2002) and use multiple price lotteries
(MPL) in which the lottery payoffs are ﬁxed in each choice task, and
the outcome probabilities are varied. While Liu (2013) and Tanaka
et al. (2010) analyzed the PT framework over the full range of gains
and losses, Harrison et al. (2010) focused only on the gain domain,
and they compared EUT to RDU by testing the non-linearity of the prob-
ability weighting function. Harrison et al. (2010) also estimated a ﬁnite
mixturemodels allowing both EUT and RDU to explain some proportion
of respondents' choices over risky lotteries.
In a similar experiment, Andersen et al. (2010) use anMPL and elicit
subjective probabilities experimentally among 150 participants in a lab
experiment, similarly estimating a mixture model and ﬁnding the RDU
dominates the EUT. This paper differs from Andersen et al. (2010) in
several ways. First, Andersen et al. (2010) use a weighting function
not typically found in the literature. Second, whereas Andersen et al.
(2010) conduct a lab experiment, this paper uses a lab-in-the-ﬁeld ex-
periment with a larger sample and radically different conditions under
which the experiment took place. Finally, in this paper two members
of the same household often participated in the experiment, whereas
in a lab experiment individuals are not likely to be related.
In Table 1, we summarize some essential characteristics of the work
cited above. Most of the previously mentioned studies rely exclusively
on CRRA utility functions to compute coefﬁcients of relative risk aver-
sion. Under EUT, CRRA utility functions are convenient toworkwith be-
cause they summarize attitudes towards risk in a single parameter,
Table 1
Risk preferences, perception framework and utility functions.
Study Country Lottery type Perception framework Utility function Probability weighting Estimated parameter
Binswanger (1981) India Hypothetical + real EUT CRRA Linear
(Holt and Laury, 2002) USA Hypothetical + real EUT CRRA + Power Linear
Miyata (2003) Indonesia Real EUT CRRA Linear
Wik et al. (2004) Zambia Real EUT CRRA Linear
Mosley and Verschoor (2005) Multiple Real + hypothetical EUT CRRA Linear
Liu (2013) China Real EUT + CPT CRRA ω(p) = exp[−(− lnp)μ] μ^ ¼ 0:69
Hill (2009) Uganda Hypothetical EUT CRRA Linear
Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) Ethiopia Real EUT CRRA Linear
Tanaka et al. (2010) Vietnam Real EUT + CPT CRRA ω(p) = 1/exp[ln(1/p]μ μ^ ¼ 0:74
Harrison et al. (2010) Multiple Real EUT + RDU CRRA ω(p) = pμ/[pμ + (1 − p)μ]1/μ μ^ ¼ 1:38
This paper Mozambique Hypothetical EUT + RDU CRRA + PRA ω(p) = pμ/[pμ + (1 − p)μ]1/μ μ^ ¼ 1:37 e
Notes: Mosley and Verschoor (2005) and Harrison et al. (2010) use data from Ethiopia, India and Uganda.
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functional form comes at the cost of generality, since a priori there is no
reason to believe that risk attitudes should be characterized by constant
relative risk aversion. Holt and Laury (2002), who used responses by US
students from laboratory experiments, is the only workwe are aware of
in this literature that relaxes the CRRA assumption. They notice that re-
spondents' choices are actually more consistent with IRRA than CRRA,
so they consider a power utility function allowing the relative risk aver-
sion coefﬁcient to be either decreasing, constant, or increasing. In this
paper, we build on the previous literature by considering a general util-
ity speciﬁcation which allows us to test altogether EUT against RDU and
CRRA against a more general valuation function.
3. The ﬁeld experiment
The ﬁeld experiment we discuss was conducted as part of the ﬁnal
survey in the impact evaluation of the HarvestPlus Reaching End Users
(REU) project in Zambézia Province of northern Mozambique. The
REUwas an integrated biofortiﬁcation projectwith a goal of reducing vi-
tamin A deﬁciency among young children and women of child bearing
age. Vitamin Awas introduced through OFSP, which havemore vitamin
A than traditionally grown white or yellow ﬂesh sweet potatoes. OFSP
vines were distributed to households at the beginning of the project
and annually thereafter. The project then provided agricultural exten-
sion focused on OFSP, nutrition extension focused on vitamin A beneﬁts
and consumption, and marketing information on OFSP to participating
households.
3.1. The REU project in Zambézia
The REU project took place between 2006 and 2009 in four dis-
tricts of Zambézia (Fig. 1). The program was implemented within
farmers' groups in 144 communities in Milange, Gurué, Mopeia,
and Nicoadala districts of Zambézia. Because existing community or-
ganizations are scarce in northern Mozambique, the project worked
with communities to identify existing organizations, usually church
groups, and then expanded or combined groups to include roughly
100 farmers on average. 3The project ran for three growing seasons,
from the 2006–2007 season to the 2008–2009 season.
The impact evaluation was designed in collaboration with the
implementing agencies. Prior to the intervention, a set of communities
deemed suitable for the intervention was randomly selected into
three groups: an intensive treatment group (Model 1), a less intensive
treatment group (Model 2), and a control group. Randomization took
place within three strata; Milange district, Gurué district, and the two
southern districts (the South), to ensure that regional or languageFig. 1. Survey location map. Mozambique. Zambézia (surveyed districts in orange).3 More details on the project and site selection are available in de Brauw et al. (2010).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics, by number of household respondents.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole sample Single headed households Households with 1 resp. Households with 2 resp. p-Value H0: (3) = (4)
% resp. in HH with 2 respondents 71.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 –
% resp. in single headed HH 4.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 –
Gender (% male respondents) 38.9 6.9 12.0 50.0 0.00
% of respondents below 30 35.6 41.4 40.7 33.5 0.10
% of respondents above 50 4.5 3.4 1.2 5.8 0.00
% respondents in treated villages 68.8 79.3 67.1 68.7 0.69
% of respondents in Milange 57.6 62.1 80.8 49.4 0.00
% respondents in Gurué 23.9 24.1 8.4 29.2 0.00
% respondents in South 18.5 13.8 10.8 21.4 0.00
% resp. who can speak Portuguese 28.6 17.2 13.8 34.4 0.00
% resp. with wage earner in household 24.5 31.0 24.0 24.3 0.93
% resp. with self employed member in household 30.6 13.8 19.8 35.4 0.00
# plots owned 3.7 3.0 3.6 3.8 0.03
Share of OFSP over SP 44.0 42.5 42.3 44.7 0.53
% resp. with experience in sweet potato (N5 years) 87.7 82.8 91.0 86.8 0.12
Total food expenditures per capita per day (USD) 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.15
Quintile 1 (poorest) 20.0 23.1 17.6 20.6 0.45
Quintile 2 20.0 30.8 25.0 17.6 0.08
Quintile 3 20.0 3.8 25.7 19.1 0.12
Quintile 4 20.2 26.9 19.1 20.1 0.80
Quintile 5 (richest) 19.8 15.4 12.5 22.5 0.00
% reporting severe income shock 6.3 3.8 5.1 6.9 0.45
% reporting severe asset shock 3.3 3.8 2.9 3.4 0.77
Number of respondents 682 29 167 486 –
Notes: the ﬁfth column reports p-values for two-sample tests of equal proportions between 1-resp and 2-resp households.
4 We also report descriptive statistics for the overall sample in Table 2.
5 During the interview, the enumeratorswere instructed to conduct the risk experiment
separately for husbands and wives in households where both agreed to participate. One
could nonetheless expect that because husbands and wives share common information
and are exposed to a similar environment, their risk preferences are potentially aligned.
6 Farmers in Zambézia frequentlymeasure crop production in terms of bags designed to
hold50 kg of drymaize. A 50kg bagholds approximately 60kgs of sweet potatoes, andwe
designed the experiment to only propose plausible hypothetical yields to farmers.
7 We include theprotocol for the experiment, translated into English, in theAppendixA.
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paper was collected in all three strata.
3.2. Data collection
Important for this paper, the impact evaluation collected socioeco-
nomic data both prior to implementation of the REU in October and No-
vember of 2006 and after the REU had been implemented for three
seasons, in mid-2009. The socioeconomic surveys were designed to
elicit information about several aspects of the household, including its
demographics, agricultural production, landholdings, experience grow-
ing sweet potatoes, non-agricultural income sources, and household ex-
penditures. The 2009 survey returned to exactly the samehouseholds as
were interviewed in 2006, so we can match information about the
individuals participating in the experiment and about the household
prior to the intervention with data from the risk perception experiment
detailed below. We speciﬁcally construct variables from the baseline
survey including respondent demographic characteristics, the
respondent's education level, household experience growing sweet po-
tatoes, and per capita food expenditures. We measure negative shocks
to the household between baseline and ﬁnal surveys using the ﬁnal sur-
vey, as well as constructing enumerator dummy variables.
3.3. The risk perception experiment
FollowingHolt and Laury (2002), we designed a hypothetical exper-
iment to elicit the attitudes of the respondents towards uncertainty
speciﬁcally related to sweet potato production. A subsample of 439
households was randomly selected from the overall sample to partici-
pate in this experiment. Whenever possible, we tried to perform the
experiment on both the household head and the spouse. For 243 house-
holds, two respondents were available for the interview; in all of these
cases, respondents were separated to avoid one inﬂuencing the other's
responses. In the other 196 households, either a spouse did not exist
or the spousewas not present. Overall, a total of 682 respondents partic-
ipated in the experiment and made choices from a menu of ordered
lotteries.
Whereas our sample is relatively unique in that it attempted to in-
clude the household head and the spouse, this feature led to someselection of households in which we could conduct the experiment
with both partners. To illustrate, we initially examine average observ-
able characteristics between households with two respondents and
households with one respondent (Table 2).4 We were more likely able
to ﬁnd two respondents in Gurué and the two southern districts,
among households with older household heads, andwewere less likely
to ﬁnd richer households in terms of baseline asset holdings, and more
likely to ﬁnd poorer households. Consequently, we further study corre-
lations between choices made by the head and spouse.5 If the way hus-
bands (wives) form risk preferences with respect to our framed
experiment depends heavily on theway their partner forms risk prefer-
ences, thenwe need to explicitly take the selection process into account.
If, on the other hand, we observe that husbands andwivesmake choices
observationally independently of one another, then selection should not
play a role in our preference parameter estimates.We return to this idea
in the next subsection.
In the experiment, the respondentwas asked to choose between two
varieties of sweet potatoes. One of these varieties (variety A) would
yield a higher output (50 50 kg bags) under good rainfall conditions,
but a slightly lower output (40 50 kg bags) under bad rainfall condi-
tions.6 The other variety (B) had more variable hypothetical yields.
With good rainfall, yields were quite high (95 50 kg bags), but with
poor rainfall, the yield would be quite low (5 50 kg bags). The respon-
dent had to make choices between these two varieties under 10 differ-
ent rainfall scenarios, as the probability of good rainfall gradually
increased from 10% to 100%.7 Note that in this context risk preferences
are being asked in a narrow, hypothetical context, and that farmers' pre-
vious experience with actual rainfall might affect the subjective beliefs
that farmers have about rainfall in the experiment.
Table 4
Pattern of responses, by gender.
N = 682 All Male Female
Stick to A (safe choice) 69 31 38
Stick to B (risky choice) 26 11 15
Shift once from A to B 587 223 364
Shift more than once 1 0 1
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For each line in the table, the respondent was asked to choose between
the less risky variety (variety A) and the more risky variety (variety B).
The net expected value of each choice task (not shown to the respon-
dent) is computed as
E A½ −E B½  ¼
X2
s¼1
P Asð ÞAs−
X2
s¼1
P Bsð ÞBs
where for each variety (A or B), s=1 indicates themore favorable state
of nature, i.e. good rainfall, and s=2 indicates the less favorable scenar-
io, i.e., poor rainfall and therefore lower sweet potato yields. As shown
in Table 3, in expected terms the expected yield was higher for variety
B than variety A for all probabilities of good rainfall of 40% and above.
We next examine response patterns by gender (Table 4). Themajor-
ity of respondents (86%) began the experiment by choosing the safer va-
riety (A) under unfavorable rainfall scenarios, and then shifted to the
more risky variety (B) as the probability of experiencing good rainfall
increased. A minority of respondents (10%) chose the safe variety
throughout all rainfall scenarios, even when presented with certainty
of good rainfall. Fewer respondents chose the risky variety from the be-
ginning to the end (4%), while only one respondent chose to change her
preferred varietymore than once. As a result, it seems that almost all re-
spondents clearly understood the experiment quite well.
We next compare the average choices by respondents with the risk
neutral choices (Fig. 2) by reporting the proportion of respondents
that chose the safer variety, variety A, by the probability of experiencing
good rainfall in the experiment.Wenote that the proportion of risky va-
riety choices increases monotonically as the probability of experiencing
good rainfall increases. However, it does so at a substantially slower rate
than would be expected if all respondents were risk neutral. Therefore,
we can conclude that at least with respect to sweet potato varieties, the
average farmer in our sample is risk averse.
3.4. Preferences among husbands and wives
As discussed in the previous section, there is some selection of
households in which we have two rather than one respondent. There-
fore, it is important to consider whether their choices were correlated
or not, and if they are correlated,whether or not including both partners
in estimating risk preferences would affect the estimates themselves. In
this subsection, we explicitly study the subsample of husbands and
wives who were both in the sample.
Among husbands and wives who both participated in the experi-
ment, the overall correlation between responses was 0.79. However,
we would expect responses to be the same in the distribution tails,
since choices were the same among most respondents. The correlation
between pairs' responses would be a concern if they were the same in
the middle of the distribution, around the choice when the risk neutral
choice switches from A to B. Speciﬁcally, if the correlation was high for
scenarios 4 to 7, our risk parameter estimates based on the entireTable 3
Payoff matrix, hypothetical experiment.
P(A1) A1 P(A2) A2 P(B1) B1 P(B2) B2 E[A] E[B] E[A] − E[B]
0.1 50 0.9 40 0.1 95 0.9 5 8.2 3.8 4.4
0.2 50 0.8 40 0.2 95 0.8 5 8.4 5.6 2.8
0.3 50 0.7 40 0.3 95 0.7 5 8.6 7.4 1.2
0.4 50 0.6 40 0.4 95 0.6 5 8.8 9.2 −0.4
0.5 50 0.5 40 0.5 95 0.5 5 9.0 11.0 −2.0
0.6 50 0.4 40 0.6 95 0.4 5 9.2 12.8 −3.6
0.7 50 0.3 40 0.7 95 0.3 5 9.4 14.6 −5.2
0.8 50 0.2 40 0.8 95 0.2 5 9.6 16.4 −6.8
0.9 50 0.1 40 0.9 95 0.1 5 9.8 18.2 −8.4
1.0 50 0.0 40 1.0 95 0.0 5 10 20 −10sample would overweight the household head-spouse pairs, since
they show up twice in the data set whereas households in which we
only interviewed one partner show up once.
Therefore, we next plot whether or not the frequency with which
the pairs' responses were the same, by scenario number (Fig. 3). As ex-
pected, pairs' responses are similar in the tails of the experiment.
Choices diverge to the sixth scenario, which only matches 57% of the
time, and then begin to increase as expected. Because husbands and
wives share a great deal in common—environmental factors, agricultur-
al shocks, and at least some forms of information, and as at least some
decision making occurs jointly at the household level, onemight expect
a priori that risk preferences among household pairs would be more
aligned than the preferences of any two individuals in the sample
drawn at random. If, on the contrary, the intra-household correlation
of responses is low, household selection would not likely affect param-
eter estimates.
To understand the degree to which risk preferences of household
pairs are correlated, for each scenario we draw 100 random pairs of re-
spondents within our data set, with replacement, and measure the per-
centage of same responses for each scenario. In Fig. 3, these percentages
appear as lighter lines, whereas the household pairs appear as the
darker line with points. For the ﬁrst three rounds of responses, the per-
centage of matching responses between the household pairs falls well
within the distribution of percentages of matching responses for the
random pairs. However, for scenarios 4 through 8, the household pairs
are on the upper end of the distribution of random pairs before falling
back to the middle of the distribution for scenarios 9 and 10. That said,
the difference between household pairs and random pairs is not dra-
matic, and for some random pairs the degree of matched responses is
quite close to the percentage of matched responses observed within
the household pairs.
To further assesswhether the degree of intra-household similarity in
risk preferences is such that we should be concerned about selection
bias affecting our parameter estimates, we conduct the following exper-
iment. For each scenario, we initially estimate the proportion of same
responses from a sample of random pairs from the data set, which is
equivalent to the sample size (243 pairs). Assuming this estimate is
the true value for the population, we then conduct a t-test against the
proportion of same responses from the true household pairs, for the
null hypothesis that the two proportions are equal, and we save the as-
sociated p-value. We then repeat this procedure 1000 times, and pro-
duce box plots of the distributions of p-values from the tests (Fig. 4).
The boxes represent the interquartile ranges of the p-value distribution,
with the 75th percentile represented at the upper end of the rectangles,
and the 25th percentile at the lower end, and the horizontal line inside
the box representing the median of the distribution. If the responses
were signiﬁcantly more correlated among true household pairs than
among random pairs of respondents, we would expect to observe
much of the p-value distribution to fall below the 10 or 5% to be lower
distribution fall below the 5% (or possibly 10%) signiﬁcance level. In
most cases (rounds 1, 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10), the interquartile range of the
distribution lies completely above the 10% horizontal line. For rounds
4, 6, 7 and 8, the median of the interquartile range falls below the 10%
line, but never below the 5% line, suggesting some selection. However,
in all cases the median of the p-value distribution lies above the 5% sig-
niﬁcance line.
Fig. 2. Risk experiment responses.
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tween husbands and wives' preferences as revealed by the experiment
is not signiﬁcantly different than the degree of similarity in preferencesFig. 3. Proportion of similar choicesthat we would observe among any other random pair of respondents.
The high observed degree of similarity is largely, but not completely,
driven by similarity in responses between households, rather thanbetween husbands and wives.
Fig. 4. Similarity of responses within households, by response round.
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holds for which both partners could be found, that selection will not
greatly affect the characteristics of risk preferences in the general sam-
ple with respect to growing sweet potatoes.
4. Methodology and results
Althoughwe can conclude that on average our sample is risk averse,
we have not yet characterized preferences theoretically. We present a
standard conceptual framework about choice under uncertainty in the
next section. The standard framework will be the basis of our empirical
analysis of risk attitudes.
4.1. Methodology
4.1.1. Conceptual framework
We assume that utility U(∑jω(pj)yj) =∑ jω(pj)U(yj) is formed
over risky lottery outcomes yj, j ∈ {1, 2}, weighted by their subjective
probability of occurrence ω(pj) with pj ≥ 0 and 0 ≤∑ ω(pj) ≤ 1.8 In8 It is not required that the sum of weighted probabilities is equal to 1. If it is less than
one, it is said that there is subcertainty overall (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).this paper, the lotteries are related to choices of sweet potato varieties
with different yields under alternative rainfall scenarios. Therefore, we
restrict our attention to the gain domain, i.e. yj N 0.
Under EUT (Bernoulli, 1738; von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), the subjective probabilities are identical to the objective
probabilities, and the probability weighting function is thus deﬁned
by ω(pj) = pj. In this case, the most commonly adopted measures
of risk aversion are given by the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion
ARA yð Þ ¼−U″ yð ÞU0 yð Þ , or by the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
RRA(y) = xARA(y) (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964). The extent to which
agents are risk averse is captured not only by some measure of the
curvature of the utility function (such as ARA(y) or RRA(y)), but
also by the non-linearity of the probability weighting function. In
this paper, we will consider both theoretical approaches. We assess
the extent to which the choices made by the respondents are consis-
tent with EUT by testing whether or not the probability weighting
function is linear. We also look at different nested speciﬁcations of
the valuation function U(.) allowing us to determine the shape of
risk preferences consistent with the data.4.1.2. Utility functions
4.1.2.1. Power risk aversion utility.We start by considering a general pa-
rameterization of the utility function that allows RRA(y) to be either de-
creasing, increasing, or constant. A parsimonious speciﬁcation allowing
10 In our speciﬁcation, (6) implies that the valuation function is consistent with EUT only
if μ= 1.
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Risk Aversion” (PRA) utility function.9 The PRA valuation function is
given by
UPRA yð Þ ¼ 1
γ
1−exp −γ y
1−σ−1
1−σ
 ! !( )
ð1Þ
The coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion is now non-increasing in x
and given by
ARAPRA yð Þ ¼ σ
y
þ γ
yσ
ð2Þ
while the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion can be written as
RRAPRA yð Þ ¼ σ þ γy1−σ : ð3Þ
4.1.2.2. Constant relative risk aversion utility. When γ= 0, the PRA re-
duces to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
which is the most commonly assumed speciﬁcation in studies of risk
aversion. It can be written as:
UCRRA yð Þ ¼ y
1−σ−1
1−σ : ð4Þ
Under this parameterization, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
is equal to σ, and the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion is assumed to
be decreasing (ARACRRA(y) = σ/y).
4.1.3. Regression model
We assume that farmers in our sample choose the sweet potato va-
rieties that deliver the highest expected utility under each rainfall sce-
nario. This setup is similar to a random utility model where UA∗ and UB∗
are unobserved single period utility levels associated with the choice
of variety A and B. For any given rainfall scenario, we assume that the
differenceΔU∗=UA∗ −UB∗ is a latent variable that depends on a set of ex-
planatory variables X and on parametersσ, γ, μ, andβ. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that
U j ¼
X
s
ω psj
 
U ysj;σ;γ
 
ð5Þ
ω psj
 
¼ pμsj= pμsj þ 1−psj
 μh i1=μ ð6Þ
ΔU ¼ UA−UB ¼ f X;σ;γ; μ;βð Þ þ ε ð7Þ
ε∼N 0;1ð Þ ð8Þ
yA ¼ 1 yN0
  ð9Þ
where s = 1, 2 denotes the bad rainfall/good rainfall states, j = A, B is
the index for the two varieties of sweet potato, and 1[y∗ N 0] is an indi-
cator function equal to 1 if y∗ N 0 and 0 otherwise. We include a set of
explanatory X variables to control for observable heterogeneity in σ,
which is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion under CRRA utility.
This approach is similar to the estimation of a random parameter
model where the estimated parameter σ^ is assumed to vary across ob-
servations according to σ^ i ¼ f Xiβð Þ ¼ αþ βXi þ ui where ui ∼ N(0, 1).9 An alternative general functional form allowing different shapes in risk aversion coef-
ﬁcients is presented in Saha (1993). The proposed that functional form does not include
CRRA as a special case, which is why we prefer working with the Xie (2000) function.The variable yA represents the choice of variety A, and σ, γ, μ, and β
are the parameters to be estimated. In Eq. (8), we assume that the
error term ε is normally distributed with variance 1 and is identically
and independently distributed between respondents. However, when
we estimate parameters, we allow choices to be correlated within
respondents.
The likelihood function for the discrete choice model described in
Eqs. (5) through (9) is:
L σ;γ; μ;βjXi; yAið Þ
¼ ∏
N
i¼1
Φ ΔU Xi;σ i;γ; μ;βð Þ
  yAi 1−Φ ΔU Xi;σ i;γ; μ;βð Þ 1−yAih ð10Þ
where Φ(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. We obtain
estimates of the parameters by maximizing the logarithm of Eq. (10).
4.1.4. Finite mixture model
Following Harrison et al. (2010) and Andersen et al. (2010), we also
estimate amixturemodelwherewe allow both EUT and RDU to explain
observed choices under uncertainty byMozambican farmers. The likeli-
hood function for this model is given by
L σ i;γ; μ;β;πjXi; yAið Þ ¼ ∏
N
i¼1
π Φ ΔUEUT Xi;σ i;γ; μ;βð Þ
  yAi
 1−πð Þ 1−Φ ΔURDU Xi;σ i;γ; μ;βð Þ
  1−yAi
ð11Þ
where π is the parameter determining the proportion of respondents
behaving according to EUT (μ= 1).
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Homogenous preferences
Wewant to learn about which form of risk preferences best charac-
terize the preferences of farmers in our sample, with respect to the two
hypothetical varieties of sweet potatoes posed to them. Since RDU is a
generalization of EUT over the gain domain and since the CRRA form
is a special case of the PRA utility function, all the speciﬁcations consid-
ered here are nested within the PRA utility function under the RDU
framework.10
We begin by estimating themodel described by Eqs. (5) through (9)
(Table 5). We initially estimate a general model, in which the parame-
ters are common across respondents (column 1). The two parameters
of the PRA utility function (1) are positive and signiﬁcantly different
from zero: σ^ ¼ 0:33 and γ^ ¼ 0:16. Recall that the parameter γ repre-
sents the difference between the PRA and the CRRA; if γ = 0, then
PRA preferences collapse to CRRA preferences. As we can reject the
null hypothesis that γ^ ¼ 0 at the 1% signiﬁcance level, we conclude
that preferences do not, on average, follow the CRRA in favor of PRA
preferences.11
Constant relative risk aversion is a convenient assumption to impose
because of the simplicity of the implied utility function. Under CRRA
utility, relative risk aversion (and the curvature of the utility function)
is summarized in only one parameter (σ). Under PRA utility however,
the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is now determined by two pa-
rameters, σ and γ, each of which inﬂuences the curvature of the utility
function. In general, while the curvature of the utility function increases
both with γ and with σ, the effect of these two parameters on the coef-
ﬁcient of relative risk aversion is different. Relative risk aversion always11 Although based on the analysis in Section 3.4we are comfortable ignoring selection in
these results, nonetheless we re-estimated all models presented in the paper, while ran-
domly selecting either the husband or wife among households with two respondents. Re-
sults (available from the authors) did not qualitatively differ from the results presented.
12 Information on total food expenditures was not collected for a small part of our sam-
ple, so the total number of observations for the conditional analysis is 5700 instead of
6820.
Table 5
Maximum likelihood estimates, PRA and CRRA models.
PRA CRRA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ 0.33∗ ∗ ∗ 0.41∗ 0.45∗ ∗ 0.74∗ ∗ ∗ 0.83∗ ∗ ∗ 0.92∗ ∗ ∗
(0.05) (0.25) (0.21) (0.01) (0.10) (0.13)
Male 0.09 0.01 −0.05 0.03
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Age b 30 0.13∗ ∗ 0.14∗ ∗ 0.04 0.00
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Age N 50 0.10 0.00 −0.06 − 0.11∗
(0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Gurue district −0.16 −0.13 − 0.14∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.11∗
(0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07)
South district 0.17∗ 0.28∗ ∗ 0.08 0.14∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.06) (0.08)
Education (speaks Portuguese) −0.06 − 0.55∗ −0.02 −0.02
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Wage in household −0.10 −0.09 −0.03 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Experience with sweet-potato N 5 years −0.04 −0.05 0.02 −0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Total food expenditure per capita −0.09 − 0.13∗ ∗ 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Severe shock to income 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.06
(0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Severe shock to assets 0.11 −0.07 0.07 0.10
(0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Village and enumerator dummies No No Yes No No Yes
μ 1.37∗ ∗ ∗ 1.24∗ ∗ ∗ 1.22∗ ∗ ∗ 1.15∗ ∗ ∗ 1.13∗ ∗ ∗ 1.08∗ ∗ ∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
F-stat (H0 : μ = 1) 42.3⁎ ⁎ ⁎ 5.20∗ ∗ 6.30∗ ∗ ∗ 75.1∗ ∗ ∗ 48.44∗ ∗ ∗ 36.0∗ ∗ ∗
p-Value (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
γ 0.16∗ ∗ ∗ 0.13∗ ∗ ∗ 0.09∗ ∗ ∗ − − −
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
N 6820 5700 5700 6820 5700 5700
Log-likelihood − 2867.6 − 2346.1 − 2195.5 − 2916.9 − 2371.2 − 2233.2
Note: maximum likelihood estimates. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ denote statistical signiﬁcance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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when γ≠ 0. This point is clearly illustrated in Eq. (3).
We depict the relative inﬂuence of these two parameters on the
shape of the utility function in Fig. 5 by plotting the utility function for
different values ofσ andγ at estimated parameter values.With this spe-
ciﬁc set of parameter values, we observe that absolute risk aversion is
decreasing (as in Eq. (2)), but relative risk aversion is increasing (as in
Eq. (3)). We demonstrate this point in Fig. 6, which illustrates that rela-
tive risk aversion is increasing for all values ofX at the estimates' param-
eter values.
A further parameter of interest is μ, which describes the shape of the
relationship between the objective probabilities of the two states A and
B, and the subjective probabilities assigned to those states by the
respondent (Eq. (6)). Note that EUT is consistent with μ = 1, and
Eq. (6) collapses to ω(p) = p if μ = 1. Therefore, in this framework
we can test the null hypothesis that μ= 1 against the alternative that
it is not (μ ≠ 1), which is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis
that preferences behave as in EUT, against the alternative that prefer-
ences follow the RDU.
We report the F statistic of this hypothesis test in Table 5, and in all
speciﬁcations we strongly reject EUT in favor of RDU. Since we ﬁnd
that μ^N1 under each speciﬁcation, the respondents' probability
weighting function is S-shaped. Respondents tend, therefore, to under-
weight small probabilities relative to the objective, and overweight larg-
er probabilities. In the left-hand graph depicted in Fig. 7, we plot the
non-linear probability weighting function against the identity function
that is imposed if we assume EUT. Note that only around a probability
of the good rainfall state of 0.6 do farmers begin to overweight subjec-
tive probabilities; before that point, they underweight objective
probabilities.We also model σ as a function of observable characteristics about
respondents (Table 5, columns 2–3 and 5–6). We focus on measuring
σ as a function of observables rather than γ, speciﬁcally so that we can
compare the effect of observables on the curvature of both the CRRA
and PRAutility functions.We include variablesmeasured in the baseline
socioeconomic survey, including the age, gender, and education level of
the respondent; total household expenditures, and previous household
experience with growing sweet potatoes. Moreover, we include con-
temporaneous variables capturing self-reported shocks to income and
asset holdings in the past 12 months, as well as an indicator of whether
amember of the household is a wage earner. Finally, we include village-
dummy variables to account for community-speciﬁc characteristics like
agroecological conditions for example, and we control for enumerator
effects during the interview.
For conditional estimates of PRA preferences, we ﬁnd that only a few
variables have a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on risk aversion
(Table 5, columns 2 and 3).12 For example, the estimated coefﬁcient
among younger respondents (less than 30 years old) suggests that
they aremore risk averse than the respondents of age 30 to 50. The gen-
der of the respondent does not appear to inﬂuence risk aversion. More-
over, we ﬁnd that respondents located in the southern districts of
Zambézia are also more averse to risks related to sweet potato yields.
In the southern districts, farmers in southern districts prefer to plant
sweet potato after they harvest the primary rice crop, so the growing
season is shorter. As a result, farmers could be more risk averse, partic-
ularlywith respect to poor rainfall, due to the short season. Respondents
Fig. 5. Power risk aversion utility function. (μ, γ) = (1, 0.16). (μ, σ) = (1, 0.33).
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swer differently than respondents who did not experience such shocks.
After taking into account village and enumerator effects, higher educa-
tion and higher level of food expenditures are also associated with
lower risk aversion. Finally, it is important to note that including control
variables to condition σ does not alter themain results. Evenwhen con-
trolling for individual and household characteristics, we still reject CRRA
in favor of PRA γ^≠0ð Þ, and we still reject EUT in favor of RDU μ^≠1ð Þ.
An open question is how badly one predicts risk preferences if using
the common assumption of CRRA preferences, assuming that PRA prefer-
ences correctly characterize risk preferences. To examine this question,
we compare the empirical distribution of relative risk aversion parame-
ters under CRRA and under PRA (Fig. 8). While it is misleading to directly
compare the relative risk aversion coefﬁcients, Fig. 8 demonstrates that
the shape of the relative risk aversion distribution differs according to
which preference environment is assumed. Therefore, the level of risk
aversion among those who are risk averse is mischaracterized when the
CRRA is assumed.
To further illustrate problems that can occur under the assumption
of CRRA, we next consider the relative ranking of risk preferences
under both preference relations. If the relative ranking is the same,
then at least the CRRA assumption gets the relative ranking right within
the data, if not the degree of risk aversion among the most risk averse.
Tomeasure the relative ranking, we ﬁrst predicted relative risk aversion
under both PRA and CRRA, and then assigned the predictions into dec-
iles, with relative risk aversion increasing by deciles. We then plotted
farmers by PRA decile on the y-axis and by CRRA decile on the x-axis
in a bubble plot, where the size of the bubble represents the number
of farmers falling into each decile cell (Fig. 9). If PRA and CRRApreferences ranked farmers similarly, we would ﬁnd 10 large bubbles
along the 45° line. Instead, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant numbers of farmers
who fall into different deciles under PRA preferences than under CRRA
preferences, as evidenced by the size and number of bubbles off of the
45° line. If one assumes CRRA, a similar group of farmers are the most
risk averse as under PRA preferences, but as farmers are predicted to
be less risk averse, the CRRA and PRA farmers diverge. In fact, many of
the farmers characterized as least risk averse under CRRA end up in
the second decile under PRA, and the least risk averse farmers under
PRA are found in every decile up to the 7th under CRRA preferences.
In general, the ﬁgure indicates that if we had made the CRRA assump-
tion, the relative ranking of risk aversion among farmers in our sample
would be dramatically different than under PRA preferences. If we re-
main conservative and consider that our estimated σ coefﬁcients classi-
ﬁed +/−1 decile apart are similar, we still ﬁnd that close to 33% of
farmers are misclassiﬁed under CRRA parameter estimates relative to
PRA parameters.
Another way to assess the implications of misrepresenting farmers'
preferences is to consider a simple crop insurance examplewhere farmers
have to choose between a risky lottery or an insurance contract against
the payment of a risk premium.We set up an example inwhich the farm-
er receives a payment of 200 under the good outcome, and 100 under the
bad outcome, with each occurring with equal probability, making the ex-
pected value of the lottery 150.We then compute the certainty equivalent
and the risk premium under the four different preference speciﬁcations
examined above, using the parameter estimates from Table 5. For this
speciﬁc example (Table 6), it appears that making the wrong assumption
about the shape of the utility function alone (CRRA vs PRA) implies that
the risk premium is substantially underestimated (3.9 units vs 15.2
Fig. 6. Absolute and relative risk aversion [(μ, γ, σ) = (1, 0.16, 0.33)].
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framework (EUT vs RDU) implies a further underestimate of the risk pre-
mium. Assuming both CRRAunder EUT rather than PRAunder RDU trans-
lates into an estimated risk premium that is underestimated by nearly an
order of magnitude. Therefore, differences in risk premia implied by as-
suming alternative preferences are substantial. We further vary the risk
faced by the farmer by increasing the spread of the risky lottery (while
preserving the expected mean), and illustrating implied differences in
risk premia in Fig. 10. The difference in risk premium between CRRA-
EUT andPRA-RDUwidens as the risk associatedwith the lottery increases.
In an agricultural context, the primary risks are likely to be small relative
to a coin ﬂip, but even under such conditions and with these parameters
the risk premium still appears underestimated.Fig. 7.Weighting function for4.2.2. Preference heterogeneity
In the previous subsection, we have imposed a single utility frame-
work on the data (either EUT or RDU). We next relax this assumption
by allowing a proportion of farmers to respond according to EUT, and
the remaining farmers to respond according to RDU. Harrison and
Rutström (2009) and Harrison et al. (2010) have recently shown that
preference heterogeneity is potentially a relevant factor to account for
in experimental data related to risk attitudes. Therefore, we base the
next set of results on the likelihood function in Eq. (11), which is similar
in spirit to a regime switching model.
Among our sample, neither EUT nor RDU fully explains observed at-
titudes towards risk related to sweet potato yields in Zambézia
(Table 7). We ﬁnd that the estimated parameter on the share of farmers
behaving according to EUT is signiﬁcantly different from zero (28%).
However, the percentage is not large; the majority of farmers still
behave according to RDU according to the ﬁnite-mixture model (72%).
Interestingly, by relaxing the assumption made on homogenous
preferences, the way RDU farmers discount objective probabilities
changes. The estimated parameter characterizing the probability
weighting function is now μ^ ¼ 0:57, which implies that RDU farmers ac-
tually over-weight small probabilities, and under-weight larger proba-
bilities (Fig. 11).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have used experimental data that was collected in
combination with data from an impact evaluation of an agricultural
biofortiﬁcation intervention that used OFSP as the delivery mechanism
for additional vitamin A. As the intervention involved growing OFSP,
we framed our experiment around growing sweet potatoes. We con-
ducted the experiment among a subsample of farm households includ-
ed in the ﬁnal impact evaluation survey, and the experiment included
682 respondents.
When we estimated risk preferences in a general form that nested
more restrictive forms of preferences typically used in the literature,
we found that we could strongly reject the hypotheses that farmers
follow CRRA preferences. We also found that by averaging across the
whole sample, we could reject the null hypothesis that preferences fol-
low EUT, accepting the alternative hypothesis that preferences follow
RDU. We also estimated the proportion of farmers whose preferences
follow EUT by estimating a mixture model; the point estimate was
0.728, suggesting that for about one-fourth of farmers, the objective
probabilities of states coincide with their subjective probabilities.
We ﬁnally demonstrate how the assumptions of CRRA preferences
affect the characterization of risk preferences. Relative to PRA prefer-
ences, CRRA preferences do reasonably well at describing the prefer-
ences of more risk averse farmers, but appear to poorly describe thethe PRA utility. RDU only.
Fig. 8. Estimated distribution of relative risk aversion for PRA and CRRA, RDU conditional estimates.
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assumption is not without cost; more ﬂexible forms of risk preferences
certainly lead to a different ranking of individuals with respect to risk
aversion, atworst badlymischaracterizing risk preferences among sam-
pled individuals.
Therefore, we suggest that researchers use caution before making
the CRRA assumption in empirical applications. One potential concern
with our application, however, is that we asked about risk preferences
in a narrowly deﬁned hypothetical context and that risk preferencesFig. 9. Bubble plot for RRA(x) distribution of PRA vs CRRA.in growing sweet potatoes might be different than in other contexts.
We believe that it might be worthwhile to replicate this analysis with
an experiment that either more broadly deﬁnes the risk domain, in-
cludes real payouts, or both.
Appendix A
Q. Risk perceptions module
Enumerator: Read the introduction to all participants in a group, but
take each respondent aside to ask them individually what their choices
are. Please try to ensure that respondents do not observe others'
responses.
Introduction: “Scientists areworking toﬁnd varieties of sweet potato
that are better than what you are used to at present. The following
choices are hypothetical, but can help provide some input to their re-
search. Assume there are two varieties being planned that have differ-
ent yield potential depending on how much it rains. Below you will
make 10 choices between the two varieties, Variety A and Variety B,
under different situations about possible rainfall. When making your
choices, assume you have access to one acre of land on which to plant
one of the new varieties. Both varieties would fetch the same price in
the market, so they only differ in the possible yields. For each of theTable 6
Risk premium for a lottery with an expected value of 150.
EUT RDU
Risk neutral CRRA PRA CRRA PRA
Certainty equivalent 150 146.1 134.8 139.5 114.3
Risk premium 0.0 3.9 15.2 10.5 35.7
Note: the certainty equivalent and the risk premia are calculated based on the estimated
parameters for the respective utility functions.
Fig. 10. Differences in implied risk premia.
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variety B in each case. All yields are measured in units of 50 kg bags.
Once again, the two varieties only differ in how they perform under dif-
ferent rainfall conditions. Variety B performs extremelywell under very
good rainfall conditions, yielding 95 bags. But it does not perform that
well if rainfall is moderate; with moderate rainfall Variety B yields
only 5 bags. On the other hand, Variety A gives more consistent yields:
if there is very good rainfall, it yields 50 bags, and if there is moderate
rainfall it will yield 40 bags. So Variety B is more risky than Variety A.
Again, if there is very good rainfall, Variety Bwill yield 95 bagswhile Va-
riety Awill yield 50bags. If there ismoderate rainfall, Variety Bwill yield
only 5 bags, while Variety A will yield 40 bags. Variety B is good as long
as rainfall is good, but it is risky. Variety A gives more moderate yields
irrespective of the rain received. Do you understand? …We will ask
you now, individually, to please tell us which variety you would prefer
under different situations where the chance of very good rainfall isTable 7
Maximum likelihood estimates, mixture model.
Estimate Standard error
Mixing parameters
πEUT 0.278∗ ∗ ∗ (0.059)
πRDU 0.722∗ ∗ ∗ (0.059)
EUT parameters
σ 0.000 (0.001)
γ 0.081∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003)
CPT parameters
σ 0.164 (0.356)
γ 0.308∗ ∗ ∗ (0.065)
μ 0.571∗ ∗ (0.260)
N 6820
Log-likelihood − 2847.2
Note: ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ denote statistical signiﬁcance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.increasing from 10% to 100%. So we will ask you: if the chance of very
good rainfall is 1 out of 10 and that of moderate rainfall is 9 out of 10,
which variety would you choose? And we will keep changing the
chance of very good rainfall. So then we will ask if you if the chance of
good rainfall is now two out of ten and the chance of moderate rainfall
is 8 of 10, what would you choose? And so on… we will ask you ten
questions changing the chance of good rainfall from 1 out of 10 to 10
out of 10, and ask your preference in each case. These are all hypothet-
ical choices, and there are no right orwrong answers. Oneway to under-
stand what is meant by the chance of very good rainfall is to think of
weather forecasts. When the weather forecasters make a prediction,
they are not certain of the prediction and say that there is such and
such percent chance of rain. This is what we mean by chance of good
and moderate rainfall. For example, over the next ten year period, the
chance of very good rainfall being 2 out 10 means over the next ten
year period there is likely to be very good rainfall in 2 years. And so
on….Please note once again that both varieties would command the
same price in the market.”
Enumerator: Please ensure that the respondent understands what is
meant by asking them to repeat back to you the structure of the choices.
Please don't translate this to say “there will be good/moderate rainfall;”
please use “likely to be”. Youmay ask one or two questions tomake sure
they've understood. Writing out the yields for the two varieties (on the
ground) may be useful. You may want to use sticks to represent ﬁve
bags and thus demonstrate the 95, 5, 50 and 40 bags for those who
are not literate. Once you are convinced they've understood the set
up, you can proceed to the choices. A common misunderstanding is to
interpret higher chance of rain as higher quantity of rain—this is not
what is meant here. You can also ask them when they switch, why
they switched.
Keymessages: Therewill be 10 choices. One variety is risky, the other
is stable—as demonstrated by the yieldswritten out. Ask the respondent
to explain the question back to you and make sure s/he understands.
Then start asking the questions and again, please ensure that the two re-
spondents from the household do not observe each other's answers.
Fig. 11.Weighting funtion for the PRA utility (mixture model). Mixture model (πEUT = 0.28).
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